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‘Viability’ is a highly contested term in debates about land reform in southern African and 
beyond. It is often used to connote ‘successful’ and ‘sustainable’ - but what is meant by 
viability in relation to land reform, and how have particular conceptions of viability 
informed state policies and planning approaches over time? By reviewing land reform 
experiences in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, this paper interrogates this 
influential but under-examined notion. It examines in particular the framings derived neo-
classical economics, new institutional economics, livelihoods approaches (both 
developmentalist and welfarist), radical political economy and Marxism, and their 
influence on policy debates in southern Africa. Through an explicit discussion of 
alternative framings of viability, the aim is to help shift the policy debate away from a 
narrow, technocratic economism, a perspective backed often by powerful interests, 
towards a more plural view, one more compatible with small-scale, farming-based 
livelihoods. 
 
Introduction 
 
‘Viability’ is a key term in debates about land reform in southern African and beyond, and 
is used in relation to both individual projects and programmes. ‘Viability’ connotes 
‘successful’ and ‘sustainable’ - but what is meant by viability in relation to land reform, 
and how have particular conceptions of viability informed state policies and planning 
approaches? More broadly, how have different notions of viability influenced the politics 
of land in recent years? This paper interrogates this influential but under-examined 
notion, reflecting on debates about the viability of land reform – and in particular about 
the relevance of small-scale, farming-based livelihoods – in southern Africa and more 
broadly3.  
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These questions are not merely of academic interest. How debates are framed and how 
success is judged is a major influence on the formulation of government policies. With 
arguments for and against redistributive land reform often hinging on the notion of 
viability, justifications for public expenditure and budget allocations can be offered if 
programmes and projects are deemed viable. Conversely, portraying redistributive land 
reform as ‘unviable’ provides a basis for arguments that this is a poor use of public 
funds. Different framings of viability also influence the way that a range of interest 
groups think about and contest the wider politics of land and agriculture in the region. 
Yet, despite its centrality in debates about land reform, viability is rarely defined, and its 
precise meaning often remains obscure.   
 
In southern Africa such debates tend to focus rather narrowly on farm productivity and 
economic returns. An implicit normative model in much usage in the region is the large-
scale commercial farm, even when policies suggest that other scales and forms of 
production, such as smallholder farming, should be accommodated. The dominant 
framing of viability is embodied in technical recommendations around ‘minimum farm 
sizes’, ‘economic units’, and ‘carrying capacities’. Methods and measures for appraisal 
of land reform – in planning, monitoring and evaluation – are defined in terms of 
marginal returns on investment or farm profitability. Processes of planning and 
implementation are framed by standard approaches to farm management and business 
plans developed for large-scale commercial farms, with the consequence that 
generalized statements indicating a role for other types of farming, such as small-scale, 
household-based systems, do not readily translate into programmatic support. This way 
of framing viability (and therefore ‘success’ and ‘failure’) is highly restrictive, but has far-
reaching consequences, since the wider benefits and costs of land reform are rarely 
examined, the social and political dimensions are often ignored, and important cross-
scale and linkage effects are not considered. Yet alternative ways of framing viability, 
drawn from a variety of analytical paradigms, are available, but have been much less 
influential in the region to date. This article explores a range of different framings evident 
in both the broader literature on redistributive land reform and in debates in the region, 
and examines their diverse practical and political consequences. For, if policy 
contestation is in part about struggles over the framing of issues, then being clear about 
the assumptions and commitments of different alternative framings is essential. 
 
The fact that large-scale commercial farms remain the implicit normative model for 
viability in Southern Africa is of course not accidental, and can only be understood in the 
context of the region’s history. Settler colonialism in the region involved large-scale land 
dispossession, the confinement of the indigenous rural population to densely-settled 
‘native reserves’, massive state support for the development of a white settler farming 
class, and discrimination against small-scale black farmers in the reserves (Moyo 2007: 
60-63). A highly dualistic and racially divided agrarian structure emerged, comprising a 
large-scale (white) capitalist farming sector, which dominated production for both the 
domestic and international markets, on the one hand, and a struggling peasant sector, 
on the other. The reserves functioned as pools of cheap, male, migrant labour for the 
emerging mines, industries and commercial farms of the region, since small plots (and in 
some cases agro-ecological factors), coupled with poor infrastructure and lack of access 
to markets, meant that peasant agriculture on its own was unable to support the rural 
population. Although a few peasant producers became successful producers of 
agricultural commodities, in particular places and at particular times, the generalized 
pattern was one of rural poverty rooted in the structural features of colonial political 
economy (Palmer and Parson 1977).  
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In countries where land alienation by the white minority was particularly marked, as in 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, liberation struggles focused on land 
dispossession as a major grievance. As a consequence, a key policy focus of post-
liberation governments in all three countries has been land reform programmes 
designed to alter the racial distribution of land holdings. But should land reform involve 
the break-up of large-scale farms into smaller production units allocated to large 
numbers of the rural poor, with agrarian restructuring conceived of as a key poverty 
reduction measure? Or, alternatively, should a productive large-scale commercial 
farming sector be retained but de-racialised, as a contribution to national reconciliation? 
Both existing land owners and aspirant capitalist farmers have a clear interest in 
resisting the break-up of large holdings, and this has converged with a seemingly 
apolitical and ‘technical’ notion of farm viability to support arguments that large 
production units need to be preserved rather than restructured. Those advocating the 
break-up of large farms, on the other hand, have advance political rather than economic 
arguments for land redistribution, and have often shied away from debating the question 
of viability.  
 
This article describes the origins of a hegemonic, ‘large-scale commercial farm’ framing 
of viability and its influence on policy debates on land redistribution in South Africa, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe. The discussion is located in the context of competing analytical 
paradigms for assessing land reform: neo-classical economics, new institutional 
economics, livelihoods approaches (and a welfarist variant), radical political economy 
and Marxism. Against this backdrop, we propose an approach to thinking about viability 
that draws on key insights from different frameworks, and we use these to suggest what 
a re-casting of the debate might imply for policy and practice in southern Africa today. 
 
Modernization and agricultural development in Southern Africa: past and present 
 
Key ideas in policy, such as the notion of viability, must be viewed in historical context. 
They emerge in particular places in relation to a range of debates and practices that are 
firmly embedded in historical experience. In Southern Africa, discourses around viability 
have a long pedigree. From the colonial era to the present, dominant views on 
agricultural development have been based, implicitly or explicitly, on a modernization 
narrative, and have survived political ruptures such as the liberation struggle and the 
attainment of independence. Normative-political constructions of ‘good’, ‘modern’ and 
‘progressive’ farmers and farming were implicit in linear models of economic 
development involving transitions from agriculture-based to industrial economies (cf. 
Rostow 1960, Schultz 1964, Johnston and Mellor, 1961). These constructs were, in turn, 
influenced by evolutionary views of technical change, in which low productivity farming 
shifts to intensive farming as a result of demographic pressure, and by technology 
transfer approaches, in which ‘scientific’ farming practices and technologies are provided 
to help modernize and civilize ‘backward’ farming systems (Scoones and Wolmer, 2002).  
 
This narrative has often come to define understandings of agricultural development in 
Africa, in relation to technology (and a shift from ‘backward’ to ‘modern’ practices), 
markets (and a shift from self-provisioning to market based production and consumption) 
and economic productivity and growth (and a shift from ‘subsistence’ to commercial 
farming) (Scoones et al, 2005). Emphases have varied by setting and period, but a 
remarkable consistency is evident across time and space (cf. Ellis and Biggs, 2001). 
Striking continuities exist between colonial prescriptions on agricultural development in 
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the 1920s or 30s, for example, and more recent exhortations about the need for a new, 
business-driven, commercial agriculture to replace older, subsistence modes (World 
Bank 2007). 
 
State-led agricultural modernization programmes peaked in the late 1940s and 1950s, 
just before decolonization was initiated, and a discourse of economic viability became 
widespread in this period. In Kenya, for example, the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 identified 
the ideal model as ‘economic farm units’ composed of a (yeoman) farmer, together with 
three labourers on a freehold property with selective credit and extension support 
(Williams 1996). Land was to be transferred to male farmers in order to boost cash crop 
production, particularly in the highlands (Throup, 1987). In South Africa, the 1955 
Tomlinson Report on black agriculture similarly identified ‘economic farm units’ as the 
goal, and in Southern Rhodesia the Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 was 
implemented in order to modernize and transform African agriculture, and create a class 
of ‘progressive farmers’ operating viable economic units (Duggan 1980).  
 
Settlement schemes of different kinds were seen as one route to achieving such goals. 
Sometimes this involved a major reorganization of patterns of settlement and land use in 
native reserves – such as following the Native Land Husbandry Act in Southern 
Rhodesia, or ‘betterment policies’ in South Africa (Yawitch 1981). It also involved the 
creation of new settlements in areas where ‘modern’, ‘progressive’ agriculture could be 
practiced, as in the African Purchase Areas of Southern Rhodesia (Cheater 1984), or 
irrigation-based resettlement schemes in Kenya (Metson 1979).   
 
In Southern Africa, a variety of institutions, such as departments of agricultural research 
and extension, were given the task of achieving the modernization of agriculture. These 
institutions were profoundly influenced by the needs, aspirations and objectives of white 
settler farmers, an important political constituency for the colonial and apartheid state 
(Herbst, 1990). In the early period many settler farms did not conform to normative 
models of commercial farming derived from realities in the American mid-west or in East 
Anglia in Britain, but these ideal types formed key reference points for polices and 
programmes. Technical agricultural knowledge imported through colonial connections 
helped frame knowledge and practice in particular ways, and so came to shape how 
notions of viability were deployed.  
 
In relation to peasant farmers living in so-called ‘tribal’ areas, recommendations to 
promote integrated, ‘mixed farming’, which became highly influential throughout the 
region, were based on models from 18th century England, as well as experiments 
undertaken in colonial northern Nigeria in the 1940s (Scoones and Wolmer, 2002).  
Later, these kinds of technical imports were complemented by ‘farm management’ 
techniques and understandings of farming systems derived from mainstream agricultural 
economics, the classic texts and training models being imported largely from the United 
States. These understandings and techniques, often based on temperate zone agro-
ecologies and production systems very different to those that were being developed in 
practice by farmers in Southern Africa, became the standardized tools-of-the-trade for 
planning and implementing agricultural development. Departments of agricultural 
research and extension tended to replicate the organizational modes and priorities found 
in Europe or the US, and opportunities to challenge dominant framings and practices 
were extremely limited.  
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Despite numerous re-organizations and notional shifts in priorities after independence, 
the institutional and organizational infrastructure of African agriculture – though 
populated by different people, with a very different formal mandate and a vastly 
expanded target group, but often with a much depleted resource base – has remained 
remarkably consistent in its biases and assumptions. The continued dominance of an 
agricultural modernization narrative is also evident in the design and priorities of such 
recent initiatives as the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme and 
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa4. These are influenced by the versions of  
agricultural development promoted by globally powerful institutions such as the World 
Bank, whose World Development Report of 2008 emphasizes the need to transform 
existing systems of production and move them towards a modernized, business-
oriented, ‘new’ agriculture (World Bank 2007). These labels and categories carry with 
them assumptions about transformation, ‘progress’ and development trajectories that 
influence the specific policies advocated.  
 
A core feature of the colonial period5 was attempts by the state to develop a class of 
‘commercially viable small-holder farmers’. In southern Africa, however, these efforts 
were largely unsuccessful. Early peasant successes that threatened to compete with 
emerging white commercial farmers were snuffed out (Phimister 1988, Bundy 1979). For 
the most part the native reserves continued to function as areas supplying labour to 
dominant capitalist sectors such as mining and industry, as they were originally designed 
to do, with peasant agriculture providing a supplement to wages and remittances, and 
thus subsidizing low wage levels (Wolpe 1972, Palmer and Parsons 1977). Even 
strenuous efforts by the Rhodesian state to create a buffer class of small-scale 
commercial farmers, in the African Purchase Areas, made little impact on the overall 
agrarian structure. This remained starkly dualistic in character, with large-scale 
commercial farming at one pole and so-called ‘subsistence farming’ at the other 
(although the latter was always more productive than stereotypes of ‘backward 
peasants’ admit, as well as more socially differentiated). Rural poverty had its roots in 
both the dispossessions that helped create this dualism, and in the discriminatory 
manner in which the agricultural sector was managed. This was widely understood, with 
the ‘land question’ fuelling support for the liberation struggle in all three countries.   
 
Inevitably, a key issue for newly elected democratic governments in Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and South Africa was whether or not to alter fundamentally the agrarian structure 
through a large-scale and rapid redistribution of productive land. For a variety of 
reasons, including doubts about the productive capacity of small-scale producers, this 
was deemed not feasible in any of the three countries. Instead, policies set out to reform 
agrarian structure more gradually, through removing barriers to racial ownership and 
encouraging the de-racialisation of commercial farming, and through versions of market-
based land reform. These policies were premised on a particular view of viability and 
centred on preserving the productive capacity of the large-scale farming sector, while at 
same time promoting the growth of small-scale commercial farming, both in communal 
areas (the former reserves) and on redistributed land. A key consequence of this choice 
is the persistence of agrarian dualism, especially in South Africa and Namibia, and the 
revitalization of colonial-era modernization narratives, that see ‘viable’ small-scale farms 
as scaled-down versions of large-scale commercial farms. These narratives have proved 
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 6 
remarkably resilient, and have continued to frame discourses on viability and the future 
of agriculture across the region.  
 
Despite the centrality of the concept, ideas of economic viability are rarely defined with 
any clarity. As van den Brink et al (2007) point out, in former settler colonies the notion 
of viability generally derived from a specified income target, and viable farm sizes were 
calculated by first setting a target minimum income for white farmers, and then 
calculating the size of the farm. Rather than an objective, technical exercise, this was ‘a 
social policy which ensured that white farmers earned an income acceptable to white 
society’ (ibid: 170). This objective provided the rationale for legislation that restricted the 
subdivision of farms. According to Moyo (2007: 68), viability was always seen through 
the lenses of both race and class, Africans being seen to have lower requirements for 
‘subsistence’ incomes than whites. Notions such as ‘viability’, despite their seemingly 
technical origins, carry within them multiple social and political meanings and 
implications. The tenacity of such concepts within policy discourses on land in the region 
is striking.  
 
Framing viability: frameworks for assessing land and agrarian reform 
 
While any term has its own location and history, it also must relate to a wider field of 
debate. What does the international literature on land and agrarian reform suggest is the 
appropriate way to assess viability?  How do debates in southern Africa, informed by 
particular historical experiences, resonate with these? There are a number of competing 
analytical frameworks commonly used in assessments of land and agrarian reform 
(Table 1). The most important approaches are neo-classical economics, recent variants 
such as new institutional economics, livelihoods approaches (and a welfarist variant 
thereof), and frameworks of analysis derived from Marxism and traditions of radical 
political economy. These approaches are associated, to varying degrees, with 
competing political ideologies and stances, and all have resonances in the southern 
African debate. Thus neo-classical economists are often associated with neo-liberal 
policy prescriptions, while new institutional economists often articulate a conservative 
form of agrarian populism, or neo-populism. In contrast, the sustainable livelihoods 
approach is associated with either ‘developmentalism’ or ‘welfarism’, a kind of centrist 
populism, which can be contrasted with the radical populism of the radical political 
economists.  Marxists emphasize the importance of class politics and the socio-
economic differentiation of rural populations. Thus a primary influence in assessments of 
viability in redistributive land reform is the choice of analytical paradigm, whether or not 
this is explicitly acknowledged. In the contested arena of policy debates on land in 
southern Africa, this choice of framing is often driven primarily by ideological 
commitment, rather than simply analytical considerations. 
 
[insert Table 1]  
 
We briefly summarize and contrast these six frameworks in order to highlight the 
importance of intellectual paradigms and their associated theories and concepts in 
framing issues and problems, as well as their political correlates.  There is of course the 
risk of over-simplification and caricature, since there are many different strands of 
thought within each of these six frameworks. But our intention is to highlight distinctive 
features and their articulation with debates about viability, rather than offer any 
comprehensive review. Clearly there are many overlaps, nuances and grey areas, that 
we hint at but do not have the space to discuss in any depth. The benefits, we hope, of 
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comparing and contrasting a wide range of perspectives will outweigh these limitations. 
In later sections we examine the degree to which these different frameworks – or 
sometimes blurred combinations of them – have framed and influenced viability debates 
in Southern Africa, and with what consequences for policy, politics and practice6. We 
believe that, by making explicit these diverse framings of land and agrarian reform – and 
so viability – and by highlighting the associated political struggles over meaning and 
consequence, the debate about the future of southern African land reform can be 
enhanced.  
 
Neo-classical economics 
 
The central concerns of neo-classical economics are well-functioning markets and the 
Pareto-optimal efficiency outcomes that are achieved if market failures and distortions 
are minimized. Government planning and intervention are viewed as being accompanied 
by rent-seeking behaviour, and therefore inefficiency. Key concepts in neo-classical 
theory include the notion of utility-maximizing activities by individuals who produce 
commodities for self-consumption or for sale, operating through a firm (or farm, in a rural 
setting), in order to maximize profit. Efficiency is evaluated by assessing factor 
productivity (i.e., the relative productivity of land, labour and capital).  
 
The ideology associated with contemporary neo-classical orthodoxy is neo-liberalism, 
with its stress on getting the state out of markets (to reduce market ‘distortions’), ‘getting 
the prices right’, and structural adjustment measures such as deregulation, currency 
devaluation, privatization and fiscal austerity. The state’s necessary role in providing 
public goods is recognized, as is the role of law in underpinning property rights and 
contracts. These reduce perceptions of risk and thus ‘stimulate profit-maximizing firms to 
invest, utility-maximizing households to save, and hence economies to grow’ (Lipton 
1993: 642). This means that neo-classical economists are ambivalent about unequal 
distributions of property rights based on ascription (e.g. inheritance) rather than 
achievement, and hence about land reform, which can create the conditions for an 
optimal, cost-minimizing, distribution of farm sizes (ibid: 642). 
 
Byres (2006: 227-29) suggests that in the post-war period neo-classical development 
economists accepted that planning and state interventions, including land reform, were 
necessary in poor economies before the market could come into its own. Byres 
distinguishes this ‘old’ neo-classical economics from the strongly anti-state views that 
eventually came to dominate mainstream development economics from the 1970s until 
the late 1990s, and is often tagged the Washington Consensus.  
 
As Byres notes, in the Washington Consensus there was no place for land reform of any 
kind (ibid: 226)7. The beneficiaries of structural adjustment are seen to be efficient 
farmers at any scale, and this can include large-scale land owners engaged in 
production, with economies of scale relevant in relation to capital, farm machinery or 
chemical inputs. The declining role over time of the agricultural sector within a 
successfully developing economy is accepted as necessary and inevitable. Trade 
                                            
6
We have chosen not to discuss approaches to viability or sustainability that stress the ecological 
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7
 See for example Lal (1983: 162-63). 
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liberalization is seen as improving incentives to agriculture through the removal of 
protections for the urban, import-substituting sector, and agricultural price increases are 
expected, leading to a switch from subsistence to cash crops, improvements in 
agricultural productivity and output and hence the incomes of the rural poor 
(Deraniyagala and Fine 2006: 52-53).  
 
In a neo-liberal perspective the growing role of agri-business in global agro-food regimes 
is viewed as an outcome of market-efficient processes based on the logic of comparative 
advantage, leading ultimately to socially optimal prices for both producers and 
consumers (Weis 2007: 119). The inconsistencies involved in wealthy OECD countries 
promoting structural adjustment in the South, while simultaneously providing massive 
subsidies to their agricultural sectors and keeping in place protectionist tariffs on 
processed agricultural goods, is one reason why critics see neo-liberalism as ideology 
rather than respectable theory (ibid: 119). 
 
In terms of neo-liberal ideology, then, viability must be assessed simply in terms of farm 
efficiency and the rate of return on investments in land and agriculture. Large farms and 
a declining rural population can be ‘socially efficient’, as can an agrarian structure 
dominated by large farms and global agri-business corporations. A viable land reform 
must promote market and business efficiency as its primary goal.  
 
New Institutional Economics 
 
For new institutional economists the neo-classical paradigm and its associated policy 
prescriptions are inadequate, and institutions assume a much more central role. In this 
view, while both peasants and large landowners are seen as rational decision-makers, 
real markets are often absent or ‘thin’ because of the existence of inadequate 
information or high transaction costs (such as the costs of supervising hired labour or 
enforcing contracts). To reduce the risks associated with imperfect information and high 
transaction costs, institutions such as rural money markets or sharecropping come into 
being. These can include interlocked markets, which are explicable as an ‘endogenous’ 
response to market imperfections. Property rights are seen as endogenous rural 
institutions that help reduce transaction costs (Lipton 1993: 641-42).  
 
Power relations and structures are recognized as important in the new institutionalist 
paradigm, since groups or coalitions seek to use or alter their property rights and 
resources to their advantage (ibid: 641). Power structures, despite being ‘endogenous’, 
can thus lead to sub-optimal outcomes for society. For Lipton (ibid: 643), this is often the 
case when large land owners prevent land markets from optimizing farm size and 
allowing the economic strengths of labour-intensive, small-scale agriculture to be 
realized. Where an inverse relationship exists between farm size and output per hectare, 
the redistribution of land from large to small, family-operated holdings can ‘accelerate 
and to some extent ‘equalize’ the (long-run endogenous) institutional outcomes of 
agricultural factor and product markets, technologies and power structures’ (ibid: 642). 
Since highly unequal distributions of land can constrain economic growth, effective 
redistributive land reforms can make large contributions to development, as well as 
underpin industrial take-off (as in parts of East Asia). 
 
To achieve these aims, Lipton (ibid: 642-43) argues that land reform must be market-
oriented and ‘incentive compatible’, and aim to replace existing economic entities that 
perform endogenous economic functions (such as credit provision, security, 
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technological innovation, processing, marketing, etc) with effective new institutional 
arrangements. It must also find a ‘power compatible’ path in order for it to be politically 
feasible. Both criteria are met by what he terms ‘new wave’ land reform, which should 
replace the state-led, land-confiscating approaches of the past that often involved the 
(forced) formation of inefficient collective or co-operative forms of production (ibid: 650-
55).  
 
In this version of land reform the major beneficiaries should be efficient, small-scale 
farmers, who are enabled by appropriate rural development policies to maximize returns 
of land and contribute to rural non-farm economic growth (Lipton, 2009). The key focus 
of viability assessment is farm efficiency, as well as overall economic efficiency (‘general 
equilibrium effects’). Assessing the potential for growth multipliers and backwards and 
forwards linkages to farming is important too, because these help contribute to rural 
poverty reduction.  
 
Lipton is a key exemplar of this type of new institutional economics thinking on land 
reform. The World Bank’s 2003 policy research report on land, authored by Deininger, 
presents similar arguments in favour of ‘new wave’ land reform, but places greater 
emphasis on policies to secure land rights and promote land markets (and rental 
markets in particular) than on redistribution. The cornerstone of these arguments is once 
again the inverse relationship, arising most fundamentally from that fact that farms, 
worked by family members, do not incur the high supervision costs incurred by large 
farms hiring in labourers, and also have higher incentives to provide effort, giving the 
former a ‘productivity advantage’ and ‘general superiority’ (Deininger 2003: 81). 
However, imperfections in credit, input, product and insurance markets can overwhelm 
the inherent productivity advantages and give rise to a positive relationship between 
farm size and productivity leading to ‘undesirable outcomes’ (ibid: 82). State policies to 
reduce these imperfections and promote rental markets are recommended, with a strong 
emphasis on strengthening property rights and tenure security in order to facilitate long-
term rental contracts.  
 
For the World Bank redistributive land reform is required where ‘the extremely unequal 
and often inefficient distribution of land ownership’ is the result of ‘power relationships 
and distorting policies rather than market forces’ (ibid: 143). Since market forces cannot 
be expected to lead to land redistribution ‘at the rate that would be required to maximize 
efficiency and welfare outcomes’, state interventions are required (ibid). Complementary 
policy instruments include secure land rights for beneficiaries, expropriation with 
compensation, progressive land taxation to increase the supply of underutilized land, 
divestiture of state land, foreclosure of mortgaged land, and promotion of rental and 
sales markets, decentralized implementation, training and technical assistance, and 
ensuring the rule of law (ibid: 155-56). Grants or loans should be provided ‘on a scale 
that is sufficient to establish economically viable undertakings, while at the same time 
striving to accommodate a maximum number of beneficiaries’ (ibid: 156). 
 
New institutional economists thus assess viability in redistributive land reform in terms of 
three main criteria: productive efficiency, higher levels of equity and contributions by land 
reform to both wider economic growth and poverty reduction. Arguments along these 
lines were made in the Soviet Union in the 1920s by the agrarian populist Chayanov, 
who advocated agricultural development on the basis of co-operative peasant 
households, organized as an independent class, and driven by the technical superiority 
of peasant household-based production systems (Chayanov 1966). Given their strong 
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emphasis on peasants/small-scale farmers and the (mostly undifferentiated) rural poor, 
new institutional economists are sometimes seen as ‘neo-populists’ or ‘neo-classical 
neo-populists’ (Byres 2004). 
 
Livelihoods 
 
A livelihoods perspective to development has influenced policy advocacy in relation to 
land reform, as well as the framing of many donor policies on land. The emphasis is 
mostly on reducing the vulnerability of the rural poor by securing their access to 
productive assets and resources (tenure reform), and sometimes reforms that result in 
greater equality in the distribution of land. Here land reform is strongly associated with 
mainstream developmentalism, as embodied in donor policy frameworks such as the 
Millennium Development Goals (DFID 2007). 
 
A key concept in this approach is multiple and diverse livelihoods that combine a range 
of capabilities, assets and activities in order to off-set risks and cope with stresses and 
shocks such as drought, disease, and loss of employment (Chambers and Conway 
1992). Another is the classification of material and social assets (including social 
relationships) into natural, human, social, physical and financial forms of ‘capital’ 
(Carney 1999). A third is the notion that livelihood strategies are institutionally and 
organizationally mediated, influencing the vulnerability or robustness of livelihood 
strategies. Land is a form of natural capital, access to which is mediated by institutions, 
such as land tenure, and policies (Scoones 1998, 2009).  
 
The ‘sustainable livelihoods framework’ is seen by its proponents as providing explicit 
recognition that the livelihoods of the poor are complex and dynamic and combine formal 
and informal economic activity. The holistic and integrative aspects of the approach have 
made it attractive in comparison to approaches that focus more narrowly on production, 
employment and household income (Ellis 2000, Shackleton et al 2000). Criticisms of the 
livelihoods approach include its neglect of power relations (Murray 2002) and of 
structural inequalities rooted in class and gender relations and their complex 
interconnections (O’ Laughlin 2004). 
 
In rural economies land is seen as ‘a basic livelihood asset, the principal form of natural 
capital from which people produce food and earn a living’, and comprises cropland, 
grazing and common lands from which a range of natural resources can be harvested 
(Quan 2000: 32). Land also ‘provides a supplementary source of livelihoods for rural 
workers and the urban poor’ and ‘as a heritable asset, land is the basis for the wealth 
and livelihood security of future rural generations’ (ibid: 32). Caste and gender inequality 
in land access are problems that need to be addressed, as is the dampening effect of 
high levels of inequality on economic growth (DFID 2007: 1-2). Land reform may be 
required to secure equitable and efficient land use and promote pro-poor economic 
growth. Land can be used as collateral for loans, providing opportunities for investment 
and accumulation and encouraging the growth of business activity in general (ibid: 6).  
 
Kydd et al (2000:18-19) agree that, while globalisation and liberalization are undermining 
the relative efficiency of small-scale farming, there are still grounds for supporting 
smallholder farming as a central feature of rural development, because it is multiplier-
rich, accessible to the poor, and creates the basis for eventual ‘good exits’ from 
agriculture. Since it is ‘unwise to automatically assume that settlement of previously 
large farms by small farms will lead to ‘win-win’ equity and efficiency gains’ (ibid: 19), the 
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case for redistribution must be made on an area by area basis. Kydd et al see potential 
for redistribution at the ‘quite extensive’ margins of large farms (ibid: 19), but also 
emphasize legislation to facilitate leasing of land and encouraging endogenous evolution 
of tenure systems towards clearly defined property rights. Government support will be 
crucial, and elite capture must be avoided, so that these policies do not ‘erode the 
livelihoods of the poor and vulnerable’ (ibid: 20). 
 
Some analysts who use a livelihoods lens to examine agrarian change stress the de-
agrarianization of rural economies in recent years. Bryceson (2000)8 argues that 
livelihood systems in Africa have been profoundly transformed over the past two 
decades. Many households have diversified their livelihoods, shifted to non-agricultural 
income sources and individualized their economic activities. Bryceson questions whether 
agriculture should remain the core focus of development policy, but notes that ‘African 
rural dwellers … deeply value the pursuit of farming activities. Food self-provisioning is 
gaining in importance against a backdrop of food price inflation and proliferating cash 
needs’ (ibid: 5). Rigg (2006: 196) notes the rapid diversification of rural livelihoods in the 
Asian contexts and suggests that ‘sustainable livelihoods … are increasingly likely to be 
divorced, spatially and occupationally from the land’. In his view policy should support 
people’s efforts to leave farming, permitting the amalgamation of land holdings and the 
emergence of agrarian entrepreneurs. 
 
In a livelihoods perspective, viability thus relates to a combination of assets, activities 
and social relationships that are robust and resilient, and which together reduce the 
vulnerability of poor households and individuals to shocks and stresses. Ecological 
sustainability is also stressed. However, in many livelihoods analyses an inherent 
tension is often revealed - between emphases on poverty alleviation via enhanced 
livelihoods of the poor (a form of welfarism), on the one hand, and on promoting 
economic growth and increased market access, on the other.  
 
 Welfarism 
 
Contemporary arguments for land reform on welfarist grounds are also often derived 
from the livelihoods approach. An emphasis on ‘poverty alleviation’, and a strong focus 
on household food security, is often proposed as a rationale. Tenure reform that secures 
access to land for food production and self-consumption is usually the main focus, but 
welfarist rationales for land redistribution are sometimes offered too. For example, the 
World Bank’s 2003 report on land policies (Deininger 2003: 148) argues that ‘access to 
relatively small amounts of land, in some cases not even owned land, can provide 
significant welfare benefits…’. The Bank’s primary emphasis, however, as discussed 
above, is on ‘productive efficiency’ as a rationale for land redistribution, which should 
aim to maximize efficiency and welfare outcomes (ibid: 143).  
 
Welfarism in relation to land currently takes a variety of forms. In recent years there have 
been calls for agricultural development and ‘livelihood promotion’ in poor countries to be 
more explicitly linked to social protection policies and programmes, such as pensions 
                                            
8
 It is important to note here that Bryceson’s work is influenced as much by materialist political 
economy as by the livelihoods approach, which illustrates the difficulty of using this typology to try 
to pigeon hole individual authors. Our intention is to highlight the influence of key concepts and 
analytical paradigms in assessments of viability, rather than to try to classify everyone within a 
wide range of nuanced  positions on land reform and agrarian change. 
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and other forms of cash transfer, employment guarantee schemes and microfinance 
(Ellis et al 2009). Social protection measures could be designed to strengthen the 
resilience and reduce the vulnerability of poor households or individuals, and agriculture 
is inherently risky. But smallholder farmers in Asia and Africa are exposed to 
‘exceptional risks’ (Farrington et al 2004, 2), many resulting from ‘over-hasty’ 
privatization of service-delivery or reductions in public investment, and market 
mechanisms are unlikely to deliver social protection. In relation to land, Farrington et al 
mention land redistribution only in passing, and identify various tenure reforms as 
important policy interventions: reform of tenancy arrangements, reform of inheritance 
laws that discriminate against women, improvements in documentation of freehold and 
leasehold rights so that land records can be used as collateral for loans, and enhancing 
poor people’s security of access to common pool resources (ibid, 3). 
 
Viability is thus defined in terms of the ability to protect poorer people from shocks and 
stress, the alleviation of poverty (according to a range of measures) and the reduction of 
vulnerability of those most at risk. While such definitions overlap with the concerns of 
those focused on livelihoods, here a viable land reform is aimed much more specifically 
at social protection and welfare goals.  
 
Radical political economy 
 
Radical political economy is very diverse, and here only one strand is discussed; that 
which tries to theorize contemporary forms of radical agrarian populism (McMichael 
2008, Rosset et al 2006)9. Radical populists see rural poverty as the result of an unequal 
agrarian structure, and emphasize the oppression and exploitation of workers and 
peasants by powerful land-owning classes and agri-business interests. Unlike Marxists, 
however, class and other divisions amongst the rural poor receive less emphasis, and 
instead the convergence of the interests of groups who live on the land is stressed. 
Peasants are seen as under threat of dispossession by policies and actions that support 
an emerging global food regime dominated by large corporations. Since the mid-1990s, 
however, these threats to family-based farming have been resisted by resurgent peasant 
movements, including some that are transnational in scope. The leading example is Via 
Campesina, the ‘peasant way’, that advances the concept of food sovereignty as a 
radical alternative to conventional agricultural and food policies (Borras 2008). Implicit in 
this notion is a very different conception of viability. 
 
Redistributive land reforms are seen as a key component of a broader agrarian reform 
that seeks to restructure class relations in the countryside (Rosset 2006). Agrarian 
reform includes a range of complementary policies alongside land redistribution, aimed 
at supporting peasant farmers and enhancing agricultural productivity, rural livelihoods 
and food sovereignty. Sometimes the inverse relationship and the contribution of 
equitable distributions of land to economic development more broadly, as in East Asia, 
are appealed to when arguing for radical land reform (Rosset 2006: 315-17).  
 
Peasants as both beneficiaries and as agents of change are the main focus of 
contemporary rural radical populism, although social movements often suggest that 
                                            
9
 Bernstein (2002) distinguishes between oppositional (anti-capitalist) and accommodationist (to 
neo-liberalism) varieties of neo-populism. We classify the former as radical populists. 
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agrarian reform should benefit other groupings as well10. The precise meaning of the 
term peasant, however, is often somewhat unclear. Borras (2008: 274) describes the 
heterogeneity of Via Campesina members, who include landless peasants and rural 
workers, small and part-time farmers in Western Europe, family farmers in the global 
South, middle to rich farmers in India, and the semi-proletariat in urban and peri-urban 
settings. These kinds of class-based differences between members, and the conflicts 
they might produce (for example, between the interests of small-scale capitalist farmers 
and the landless labourers they employ), are often ignored or down-played in radical 
populist analyses.  
 
McMichael argues that contemporary peasant movements are reframing the classical 
agrarian question and formulating an alternative version of modernity. Mainstream 
development, it is argued, is complicit with neo-liberal globalizations and an international 
food regime overseen by the World Trade Organization, is dominated by corporate 
interests from the North and leads to ‘peasant redundancy’ (McMichael 2008: 209). 
Peasant movements reject this ideology and trajectory, pointing to its disastrous effects 
on food production by small-scale farmers in the South. The global dominance of 
industrialized farming and agri-business interests in the North, underpinned by rich 
country state subsidies, is fuelling cycles of dispossession in the South, and de-
peasantization is leading to the massive growth of a displaced, casual labour force, it is 
argued. In addition, such analysts argue, farming systems that rely heavily on artificial 
fertilizers, chemicals and fossil fuels are much less ecologically sustainable than the 
peasant systems that they are replacing. 
 
Movements such as Via Campesina propose a notion of food sovereignty, ‘the right of 
each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its basic foods, 
respecting cultural and productive diversity’ (cited in McMichael, 2008: 210). Corporate 
agriculture entails securing the conditions for capitalist accumulation by lowering the cost 
of labour worldwide, and ‘rules out a place for peasants, physically expelling them from 
the land, and epistemologically removing them from history’ (ibid: 213). In contrast, the 
food sovereignty movement is grounded in ‘a process of revaluing agriculture, rurality 
and food as essential to general social and ecological sustainability, beginning with a 
recharged peasantry’ (ibid).  
 
Conventional criteria for assessing viability in terms of efficiency and productivity, drawn 
from an economic logic that fetishizes growth in quantitative terms, are rejected. These 
criteria externalize ecological effects such as chemical pollution, discount energy costs 
and subsidy structures for agri-business and undervalue the economic costs of agro-
industrialization (ibid: 214). While conventional criteria based on the ‘spurious logic of 
monetary valuation’11 lead to small-scale agriculture being viewed as inefficient, food 
sovereignty emphasizes the ‘incommensurability of diverse agri- and food-cultures’ and 
an ‘agrarian identity based in a value complex weaving together ecological subjectivity 
and stewardship as a condition for social and environmental sustainability (ibid: 215).  
                                            
10
 A civil society statement issued at the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development  in 2006 calls for agrarian reform that will benefit  ‘communities of peasants, the 
landless, indigenous peoples, rural workers, fisherfolk, nomadic pastoralists, tribes, afro-
descendents, ethnic minorities and displaced peoples, who base their work on the production of 
food and who maintain a relationship of respect and harmony with Mother Earth and the oceans’ 
(cited in Borras 2008: 143). 
11
 This phrase is drawn from Martinez-Alier (2002: 150), cited in McMichael 2008: 214. 
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For this strand of contemporary radical populism, viability in land reform thus means the 
ability of productive small-scale farming to secure peasant livelihoods, but also to 
promote ‘broad-based and inclusive local, regional and national economic development, 
that benefits the majority of the population’, as well as ecologically sustainable methods 
of farming (IPC for Food Sovereignty 2006, cited in Borras 2008: 144). Viability in this 
conception must be assessed at a scale beyond the individual farm or land reform 
project, and seen in the context of a new agrarian order that embodies social justice, 
socio-economic transformation and ecological sustainability. 
 
 Marxism 
 
Marxist analyses of land reform and agriculture are very diverse and disagreements over 
nuance and interpretation are common. They, however, share a central focus on class 
relations, class structure and the dynamics of capital accumulation in agriculture. Key 
concepts include the social relations of production, the unequal distribution of property 
rights between classes, and class power (both economic and political). A key issue is the 
contribution of agriculture to capitalist accumulation and industrialization more broadly 
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009a: 5). This was a central concern in classical framings of the 
‘agrarian question’ in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and is debated today in the 
very different context of neo-liberal globalization.  
 
The ‘classic’ agrarian question is usefully summarized by Bernstein (2004:198-200). In 
pre-capitalist societies the surplus labour of peasant producers is appropriated by landed 
property through rent. The transition to capitalism involves a process of primary 
accumulation that sees the formation of new agrarian classes (capitalist landed property, 
agrarian capital, and proletarian agricultural labour). The logic of capitalist social 
property relations establishes the conditions of market dependence, and drives the 
growth of agricultural productivity through technical innovation. If emergent industrial 
capital is strong enough to secure its interests, the enhanced agricultural surplus can be 
mobilized for industrial accumulation. Primary or primitive accumulation involves the 
dispossession of peasants, who are ‘freed’ to work in industry and other non-agricultural 
enterprises. Increased agricultural productivity helps lower the costs of reproducing the 
urban proletariat, contributing to capitalist accumulation in general. 
 
Marxist analyses of the agrarian question focus on agrarian transitions in specific 
contexts. Resolution of the agrarian question can be achieved in variety of ways, 
including ‘from above’, as in the case of 19th century Prussia, where a land owning class 
metamorphosed into an agrarian capitalist class, or ‘from below’, where peasants 
differentiate themselves over time into classes of agrarian capital and agrarian labour 
(the ‘American path’). To destroy the power of pre-capitalist landed property and ensure 
a successful transition to capitalism, a redistributive land reform, typically of the ‘land to 
the tiller’ variety, may be required. In this conception of the agrarian question ‘[o]nce pre-
capitalist landed property – with its predatory appropriation of rent (vs productive 
accumulation) – is destroyed …. there remains no rationale for redistributive land reform 
….  any notion of redistributive land reform that advocates the division of larger, more 
productive enterprises (capitalist and/or rich peasant farms) is ipso facto both 
reactionary and utopian’12 (Bernstein 2004: 199). It is utopian because it is unlikely to 
‘achieve its stated objective of ‘efficiency and equity’, of increasing agricultural 
                                            
12
 Emphasis in original. 
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productivity and rural employment and incomes on the basis of an egalitarian structure 
of ‘family’ farms’ (ibid). Byres (2004) and Sender and Johnson (2004) are representative 
of this strand of Marxism13.  
 
Bernstein (2004: 202) proposes another interpretation of the agrarian question: that in 
the contemporary world there is ‘no longer an agrarian question of capital on a world 
scale, even when the agrarian question – as a basis of national accumulation and 
industrialization – has not been resolved in many countries of the ‘South’’14. He argues 
that a new agrarian question of labour has come into being, separated from its historic 
connection to that of capital, and manifested in struggles for land against various forms 
of capitalist landed property. This agrarian question is not centred on the development of 
the productive forces in agriculture, but on a crisis of the reproduction of increasingly 
fragmented classes of labour within a capitalist system unable to generate secure 
employment at a living wage for most people.  
 
In Bernstein’s conception ‘classes of labour’ include those engaged in unskilled wage 
labour, in insecure informal sector activities, in small-scale farming, and in various 
combinations of these, often linked across urban and rural sites and sectoral divides 
(ibid: 206). Peasants are best understood as petty commodity producers subject to 
processes of class differentiation: some succeed in becoming small rural capitalist 
farmers, some are able to reproduce themselves as small farmers, but others have to 
engage in wage labour or other forms of activity, such as micro-enterprises, to secure 
their livelihoods (Bernstein 2006: 454). Fragmentation and differentiation means that 
land struggles are ‘likely to embody uneasy and erratic, contradictory and shifting, 
alliances of different class elements and tendencies’ (ibid: 456).  
 
Bernstein questions ‘uncritical attachment to the benefits of large-scale farming’ (ibid: 
458), partly because the scale and distribution of capitalist property is often speculative 
rather than productive in character, and also because ‘the productive superiority of 
large(r)-scale farming is often contingent on conditions of profitability underwritten by 
direct and hidden subsidy and forms of economic and indeed ecological rent’, as well as 
the environmental and social costs of modern capitalist arming systems. He is equally 
sceptical of ‘small is beautiful’ arguments, or indeed any models of ‘virtuous farm scale’ 
constructed on deductive grounds, and emphasizes the importance of agriculture being 
able to provision the growing urban population of the world (ibid, 458). 
 
Other Marxists are not of the view that the agrarian question of capital has now been 
resolved, or can be separated from the agrarian question of labour. Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay (2009b), for example, argue that the core of the agrarian question is the balance of 
class forces, nationally and internationally, between capital and labour. The balance of 
forces is contingent and variable, producing substantive diversity across different 
national and regional contexts, but the nature and trajectory of accumulation within 
(incomplete) transitions to capitalist agriculture remain a central issue in many parts of 
the world. They also argue that in an era of neo-liberal globalization, the agrarian 
question has assumed new relevance, with food and agricultural production within global 
                                            
13
 Sender and Johnston argue that in South Africa the redistribution of commercial farms to small 
farmers will have only negative effects on the employment and incomes of the rural poor, who will 
benefit most from policies that promote ‘capitalist farming and the growth of decently remunerated 
agricultural wage employment’ (Sender and Johnston 2004: 159). 
14
 Emphasis in original. 
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circuits of accumulation becoming of increasing concern to capital (ibid: 332), and 
massive levels of agro-food imports by China playing a key role within the global 
economy (ibid: 324).  
 
Neo-liberal globalization is extending the commodification of rural economies, and 
market-led concentration of land ownership is contributing to ongoing ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’ (of the rural poor). The increasing emphasis on agricultural exports as 
the motor of accumulation means that a key aspect of the agrarian question in countries 
of the South is now the nature and extent of linkages between the export-oriented sub-
sector and the peasant production sub-sector. These linkages deeply influence the 
character of agrarian transitions under current conditions, and thus the capacity of a 
rural economy to enhance peasant livelihoods (ibid: 324-327).  
 
From a Marxist perspective, then, viability in redistributive land reform is primarily a 
function of class relations and dynamics, and could refer to either successful 
accumulation by emerging classes of agrarian capital, either ‘from above’ or ‘from 
below’, or the reproduction of peasant farmers as petty commodity producers, or 
improved prospects for the livelihood security of differentiated classes of labour, for 
whom farming may be only one source of income. These are often mutually exclusive 
pathways, which means that answering the question ‘viability for whom?’ is likely to be 
politically contested. Another key criterion for Marxists, however, is the ability of growth 
in agriculture to contribute to national economic growth more broadly, which means that 
for society as a whole, viability must mean increasing productivity via reinvestment of a 
portion of surplus value.  
  
Viability in redistributive land reform in southern Africa 
 
How, then, have these different perspectives, each framing viability in very different 
ways, influenced the policy and practice of redistributive land reform in southern Africa 
over time? As we have seen, the way viability is defined has a major impact on the way 
land and agrarian reform is conceived, planned for, and politically contested.  
 
As discussed above, modernization narratives, focused on promoting an ‘economically 
viable agriculture’, have deeply influenced the framing of policies for redistributive land 
reform in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. But this has often been in a somewhat 
ambiguous manner. Indeed, a key feature of land reform debates in southern Africa is a 
pervasive disconnect between discourses centred on the politics of land reform, often 
involving heavy doses of populist and nationalist rhetoric, drawing on a variety of 
arguments with their roots in livelihoods perspectives, agrarian populism and Marxism, 
and the more technical discourses of economics, which stress pragmatic adjustments at 
the margins, and draw on variants of neo-classical and new institutional economics. 
Across the region, policy coherence has proved elusive (Lahiff 2003). In the following 
section we offer a brief review of some of the ways in which viability has figured in policy 
discourses in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia, and explore the degree to which the 
different framings discussed above have influenced the way land and agrarian reform 
has been thought about, implemented and reflected in political contests over land15.  
 
 South Africa 
                                            
15
 For more comprehensive country overviews, see papers by Lahiff (South Africa, Marongwe 
(Zimbabwe) and Werner and Kruger (Namibia) on www.lalr.org.za . 
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The objectives and scope of post-apartheid land reform are set out clearly in the 1997 
White Paper on South African Land Policy, summarizing the goals of land reform as: ‘to 
redress the injustices of apartheid; to foster national reconciliation and stability; to 
underpin economic growth; and to improve household welfare and alleviate poverty’ 
(DLA 1997: v). A number of economic benefits are identified, including food security for 
the rural poor, and opportunities for expanded agricultural production by around 100,000 
small-scale and subsistence farmers (ibid: 13). Land reform is said to be able to make a 
major contribution to reducing unemployment, given the potential of small, family-
operated farms to generate more livelihoods on high potential arable land than larger 
farms and through the multiplier effect on the local economy. Implicit in these rationales 
is the view that small-scale forms of production offer many advantages over large-scale 
production.  
 
A ‘market-assisted’ approach to land acquisition and transfer was adopted, based on 
voluntary transactions between willing sellers and willing buyers (ibid: 37). Grants were 
to be made available to applicants, and ‘the poor and marginalized’, as well as women, 
were targeted. Other criteria for prioritizing projects included the ‘viability and 
sustainability of projects’ defined in terms of economic and social viability of intended 
land use, fiscal sustainability by the local authority, environmental sustainability, 
proximity and access to markets and employment, and availability of water and 
infrastructure (ibid: 43). In framing the design of the programme a new institutional 
economics perspectives mixed uneasily with livelihoods and welfare priorities. 
 
By the end of the 1990s progress in land redistribution was very slow, and a major 
problem was the lack of resources made available for post-transfer support to 
beneficiaries (Turner and Ibsen 2000). In addition, most redistribution projects involved 
groups of applicants pooling their government grants to purchase farms, as a 
consequence of the small size of the grant relative to farm size and the general 
reluctance of sellers and officials to sub-divide farms. Tensions and conflicts within large 
groups were common. In 1999 a review of the programme was commissioned, and a 
new policy framework called Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
was announced in 2000.  
 
Under LRAD the previous focus on targeting land redistribution at the poor gave way to 
an emphasis on promoting black commercial farming, with a separate food security 
programme aimed at the poor16 (Jacobs 2003). Larger grants together with loan finance 
were offered to applicants, on a sliding scale, and an income ceiling was removed to 
encourage black entrepreneurs to apply. ‘Commercial viability’ now became a key 
criterion for approving the business plans required for all land reform projects. 
Agricultural support programmes for land reform beneficiaries were announced, to be 
implemented by provincial departments of agriculture, but these have been under-
funded, poorly planned and ineffective to date (Lahiff 2008). According to Lahiff (2007b: 
1589), ‘the official emphasis on commercial ‘viability’ has increased considerably since 
the beginning of the land reform programme’, and ‘the ‘commercial’ logic of LRAD is now 
applied to all land reform applicants, regardless of their resources, abilities, or stated 
objectives’. The key mechanism through which this commercial logic is applied is the 
business plan, which is usually drawn up by private consultants who have little contact 
with the intended beneficiaries:  
                                            
16
 The food security programme was never operationalized. 
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Such plans typically provide ultra-optimistic projections for production and 
profit, based on textbook models drawn from the large scale commercial 
farming sector, and further influenced by the past use of the land in 
question. Production for the market is usually the only objective, and 
plans typically require substantial loans from commercial sources, 
purchase of heavy equipment, selection of crop varieties and livestock 
breeds previously unknown to the members, hiring of labour (despite 
typically high rates of unemployment amongst members themselves) and 
sometimes the employment of a professional farm manager to run the 
farm on behalf of the new owners… 
 
A central weakness of most business plans is that they assume that the 
land will be operated as a single entity (i.e. as used by the previous 
owner), regardless of the size of the beneficiary group…. Because of the 
lack of support for subdivision, beneficiaries are often obliged to purchase 
properties much larger than they need, and even to expand the size of 
groups to aggregate sufficient grants to meet the purchase price. This 
results in widespread problems of group dynamics as former single-owner 
farms are turned into agricultural collectives…. (Lahiff 2007b: 158-89). 
 
Outside of government, the language of viability dominates the discourse of a 
conservative alliance of landowners, agricultural economists and officials which is 
opposed to changes in agrarian structure, and argue instead for de-racialisation of 
landownership (ibid: 1589), and the establishment of ‘viable and sustainable upcoming 
commercial farmers’ (Doyer 2004: 8). This vision underpins the Strategic Plan for 
Agriculture agreed in 2001 between farmers’ unions (representing white and black 
commercial farmers) and government. The strategic goal for the sector is ‘to generate 
equitable access and participation in a globally competitive, profitable and sustainable 
agricultural sector contributing to a better life for all’ (DoA 2001: 3).  Enabling black 
South Africans to become successful in commercial farming and agribusiness requires 
‘well designed and targeted efforts to level the playing field and bring about a more 
representative and diverse sector’ (ibid: 8). Land reform is identified as critically 
important for ensuring ‘broad-based participation in the agricultural mainstream’, not for 
altering agrarian structure. 
 
Despite the new focus on commercial viability, high rates of failure in land reform 
continued to make headlines, and in 2005 a National Land Summit involving a wide 
range of stakeholders called for a fundamental review of land reform policy, including the 
willing seller, willing buyer principle. Following the Summit, the idea that land 
redistribution should be embedded within a wider agrarian reform focused on poverty 
reduction and that creates opportunities for smallholder farmers, became common in 
policy and public debates. However, there has been little clarity on what this might mean 
for beneficiary selection, programme design, post-transfer support and agricultural policy 
more generally (Lahiff 2008).  
 
In 2007 the Department of Agriculture commissioned a study of ‘minimum viable farm 
size’ in different agro-ecological regions, to guide land reform planning (Aihoon et al 
2007). This would provide ‘an acceptable level of disposable household income’ to a 
farmer and a dependent family (ibid: 7). The study recommended that the baseline 
should be a minimum household income of R4000/month (equivalent to the mean 
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income of ‘emerging consumers’), well above the official poverty line of R2275/month. 
One rationale was that this target group would attract ‘more competent small farmers 
than the more marginalized and less skilled communities’ (ibid: 19). Adding premiums to 
compensate for risk and responsibility, and allowing for reinvestment of some income 
into the farming business, resulted in a targeted minimum net farm income of 
R7400/month. Farm sizes needed to provide such an income would vary by category of 
farming enterprise (based on extensive grazing, field cropping, horticulture, tree crops 
etc) and by agro-ecological region, the assumption being that the economics of 
commercial farming under current conditions would provide the basis for these 
calculations. 
 
Such visions of viability echo the colonial discourses on modernization, and are 
sometimes located in terms of a neo-liberal framing of land reform that emphasizes 
business profitability. This view is expressed by private sector-funded think tanks such 
as the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE, 2005, 2008), as well as 
organizations representing large-scale farmers. Given the legacies of colonial rule and 
apartheid, it is acknowledged by such groupings that the commercial farming sector has 
to be de-racialized, but the beneficiaries will be a few, relatively better-off black farmers 
and landowners, not the rural poor, because land reform ‘is not the answer to rural 
poverty’ (CDE, 2005: 30).  
 
Political debates on land policy, however, continue to be disconnected. For example, in 
the wide-ranging resolution adopted by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) at its 
2007 national conference in Polokwane calls for an ‘integrated programme of rural 
development and agrarian change’, and for policies that support agriculture and labour-
intensive forms of production in particular, expand the role and productivity of small-
holder farming by the rural poor and land reform beneficiaries. It also resolves to 
restructure value chains and promote co-operatives, and review policies and laws that 
promote ‘capital intensity and farm consolidation ... and that make it difficult to 
redistribute land to a modern and competitive smallholder sector’17. The 2009 ANC 
election manifesto promises that the ANC will ‘intensify the land reform programme’ and 
provide the rural poor with ‘technical skills and financial resources to productively use 
the land to create sustainable livelihoods and decent work’18.  
 
These statements suggest that viability in land reform needs to be assessed in terms of 
a wider set of criteria than those derived from large-scale commercial farming, but what 
these might be is not spelled out. Meanwhile, in the South African context, the dominant 
technical framings centre, not on a broader focus on agrarian restructuring, livelihoods 
and welfare issues, but on narrow business and target income criteria of viability. 
 
 Zimbabwe 
 
In Zimbabwe land resettlement formed a major element of post-independence 
government policy. Ambitious targets were set in the early 1980s, and a commitment to 
offer land to war veterans and the extremely poor (Palmer, 1990). In Zimbabwe, welfarist 
goals for land reform have been combined with those that stress increased productivity 
and contributing to economic growth. The first post-independence resettlement 
programme set out to ‘ameliorate the plight of people adversely affected by the war and 
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 See www.anc.og.za/ancdocs/history/conf/conference52  
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 See www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/manifestos.html  
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rehabilitate them’, and to ‘provide, at the lower end of the scale, opportunities for people 
who have no land and who are without employment, and may... be classed as destitute’, 
as well as to ‘extend and improve the base for productive agriculture in the peasant 
farming sector’ (Government of Zimbabwe 1980, cited in Gonese and Mukora 2003: 
175). The second phase of resettlement, initiated in the 1990s, included the objective of 
reducing ‘the extent and intensity of poverty among rural families and farm workers’. 
  
In the early period there were essentially two competing ideas about viability in land 
reform. First, there was the political imperative to address racially skewed patterns of 
land holding, within the constraints of the Lancaster House agreement. Providing land 
for former guerrilla fighters was a key part of the demobilisation process, and addressing 
extreme poverty in the communal areas formed part of a wider commitment by the new 
independent government to achieving food security for the poor and a more equitable 
pattern of development. Second, in parallel, and seemingly not in contradiction with the 
first imperative, was a technical version of agricultural viability, to be secured through 
farm planning and technical models.  
 
Resettlement plans thus proposed a variety of different ‘models’. These included Model 
A schemes, based on a planned village settlement and land use similar to that promoted 
in communal areas in earlier decades; Model B schemes, based on a socialist 
cooperative model; Model C out-grower schemes, linked to state farms; and Model D 
schemes, based on a village ranch model. In practice the village-based Model A 
dominated the resettlement landscape. This was a close replica of the vision for re-
organized communal areas advocated by the influential American missionary and 
agricultural extension advisor, E.D. Alvord, in the 1930s (Alvord 1948). It involved 
separate grazing and arable areas in the context of a mixed farming system, a planned 
village settlement dividing the two, and full-time farmers engaged in productive and 
efficient smallholder agriculture, gaining the benefits of new technologies through state-
supplied extension. For new settlers who complied with this vision, familiar livelihood 
strategies had to fundamentally alter, with links to kin and associated labour and draught 
sharing arrangements, key features in communal areas, disrupted. A prohibition on 
external employment reduced opportunities for remittance-sourced investment, and, 
given the wealth status of many new settlers, there were major capital constraints on the 
new farms. In this early period resettlement farming was circumscribed by this narrow 
view of viability.  
 
Over the course of the 1980s, however, a number of shifts in thinking and practice 
occurred: each had implications for how viability was thought about. First, the strict 
planning and extension regime was difficult to maintain. Field-level agents realised that 
its strictures did not always make sense, and, at the margins at least, a certain amount 
of discretion was allowed (Alexander 1994: 334-35). Second, the early rush to do 
something about resettlement waned. Under the restrictive ‘willing-seller, willing-buyer’ 
conditions of the Lancaster House agreement, combined with the intensive planning and 
investment required to establish schemes, the programme was proving expensive. The 
pace of resettlement slowed and the ambitious targets set at 1980 were revised 
downwards. Third, with the slowing of the programme as a whole, the range of models of 
resettlement being promoted was narrowed essentially to the Model A schemes. Fourth, 
there was a significant shift in the process of selection of resettlement beneficiaries over 
time. While the initial settlers were indeed predominantly poorer (with fewer assets and 
less land in the communal areas), in the late 1980s asset-rich, skilled farmers became 
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the main target group for resettlement. This was formalized in the government’s 1990 
Land Policy document (GoZ, 1990; see Moyo, 2000).  
 
Through the 1980s these trends – and particularly the shift in resettlement beneficiaries 
– had a significant impact on how the ‘viability’ of resettlement was viewed. At the 
beginning, the programme was seen very much in social welfare terms, linked to a 
political commitment to redress inequality and reward liberation fighters. Except at 
election times, the programme was out of the political limelight and not seen as a major 
priority. Indeed, by the mid-1980s, the commercial farming sector was booming, with 
continued substantial support from the government, combined with a growing number of 
private initiatives geared to entry into new markets, including horticulture, floriculture, 
and wildlife. With less – or only sporadic - political interest, it was easy to hand the 
programme over to the technocrats.  
 
The agricultural extension service, Agritex, was by now the main government agency 
involved. Tasked with providing technical advice to agriculture, with its previous history 
largely focused on the commercial sector, planning and extension took on a particular 
form. In extension manuals and training programmes, viability was defined in narrow, 
technical and economic terms and centred wholly on agricultural production, 
emphasizing efficiency metrics drawing on neo-classical economics perspectives. The 
models used were based on farm management plans, rates of return and enterprise-
specific budgets derived directly from the commercial sector. As the planners saw it, the 
drift of the land reform programme towards promoting the ‘expansion of the communal 
areas’ had to be stopped. If the resettlement programme was to mean anything, they 
argued, it must provide income and production for the nation, and be a model for small-
scale, entrepreneurial commercial farming.  
 
At the same time, the early 1990s saw major shifts in economic strategy in Zimbabwe, 
especially following adoption of the structural adjustment policy (ESAP) from 1991, 
pushed by an ideology of neo-liberalism by the International Financial institutions. An 
export-oriented, free-market agenda drove government policy, with redistributive land 
reform now seen as a marginal issue, one which was not going to deliver the economic 
growth and foreign exchange earning possibilities that a focus on the commercial 
agricultural sector would. This remained largely in white hands, and efforts to ‘indigenize’ 
commercial farming took centre stage. In this period, land acquired for the resettlement 
programme was often offered on long-term leases to well-connected, black business 
people, politicians and security force personnel (Moyo 2000, Alexander 2006). With 
structural adjustment putting a major squeeze on government resources and donors 
being reluctant to support it, the pace of resettlement declined, with only 20,000 
households being resettled between 1989 and 1996 (Moyo, 2000).  
 
By the late 1990s results began to emerge from the long-term monitoring of resettlement 
households (Kinsey 1999, Deininger et al 2000, Gunning et al 2000; Hoogeven and 
Kinsey 2001). Settler beneficiaries were reported as having higher incomes, lower 
income variability and more evenly distributed incomes (although higher childhood 
malnutrition) than their (near) equivalents in the communal areas (Kinsey 1999). Kinsey 
and colleagues argued that these (mostly) positive results emerged after a time lag, with 
an establishment phase where people organized themselves, gained access to services 
and accumulated productive assets (Kinsey 2003; Owens et al 2003). In sum, ‘viability’ 
had to be given a time dimension, and was not just the result of efficient production, but 
also about social organisation, institution building and coordinated post-settlement 
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support. Emphasis thus extended to institutional and wider livelihoods perspectives, 
moving beyond the narrow neo-classical economics focus on commercial business 
models. 
 
In this period, however, it was political processes, not empirical evaluation of 
performance and debates about different versions of viability, which put land reform back 
on the agenda. Land became central to a reassertion of the Mugabe government’s 
populist/nationalist credentials (Hammer et al, 2003; Moyo and Yeros 2005, 2007). In 
1997, under the powers of the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, the government began a 
process of designation of 1471 commercial farms for compulsory purchase. As in the 
1990 land policy, there were to be two main target groups: poor, landless people from 
communal areas, and entrepreneurial farmers (with college training or a Master Farmer 
certificate). A dual approach to resettlement was recognized – with welfare goals for the 
poor and landless and a production and business orientation for others. Implicit 
assumptions about ‘viability’ were evident: productive use meant making use of the 
whole farm, and direct involvement in farm management; there was a new emphasis on 
the entrepreneurial, small-scale commercial farmer. While there were social welfare 
objectives running in parallel, and quotas set for particular categories of people (female 
headed households, war veterans) highlight more populist social justice criteria, the main 
thrust re-emphasized a commercial orientation for resettlement.  
 
In 1998 the government presented the Phase II plan of the Land Reform and 
Resettlement Programme to a donor conference (GoZ, 1998). This identified the slow 
pace of land reform as a problem, and the urgent need to scale up the programme. Land 
reform, it was claimed, would contribute to the economy by increasing the number of 
commercialized, small-scale farmers using formerly under-utilized land, and, through 
careful planning, would result in environmentally sustainable use. Such a policy, it was 
argued, would increase the conditions for sustainable peace and social stability by 
removing imbalances of land ownership in the country (GoZ, 1998). A series of model 
plans for resettlement were presented, including a village model (A1), a village ranch 
model, a self-contained small-scale commercial farming model (A2) and an irrigation 
scheme model. Technical designs embodied versions of viability, making a clear 
distinction between village-based systems, where production was for household food 
security (A1, again echoing Alvord’s thinking in the 1930s), and commercial systems, 
where a business model of viability was assumed (A2, echoing the African Purchase 
Area, small-scale farming models of the 1950s).  
 
Twenty years after Independence, land reform looked set to move forward with a vision 
of ‘viability’ once again firmly based on a dualistic system of agriculture, with commercial 
profitability and economic returns the central metrics of success. But it was not to be, as 
a new political dynamic took hold. An announcement by the government in late 1998 that 
two million hectares of land were to be acquired upset the careful balance achieved only 
months before. From 1999, in the midst of political confusion and intense debate 
generated by a Constitutional referendum and in the run-up to the 2000 national 
elections, land invasions started across the country. Sometimes these were 
spontaneous efforts involving only local people, sometimes they were organised by 
networks of war veterans, and sometimes they involved the government and security 
forces. (Chaumba et al 2003a, Moyo and Yeros 2005, Marongwe 2009)  
 
In parallel to the government’s objectives, based on the commercial viability of the 
smallholder sector, other visions of the resettlement programme soon emerged – 
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including claims for restitution of ‘ancestral lands’, compensation for war veterans, and 
wider social and equity goals linked to a radical political economy argument for the 
restructuring of the agrarian economy. Each suggested in turn different framings of 
viability, and the neat if uneasy consensus struck around a commercially-driven 
smallholder sector, linked to a reduced, but still significant, large-scale commercial farm 
sector, rapidly unraveled. The hastily concocted ‘Fast Track Programme’ confirmed 
elements of the earlier plans, including the distinction between A1 and A2 models, as 
well as maximum farm sizes by type of farm and agro-ecological region (GoZ, 2001). 
Large targets for land acquisition were set – initially five million hectares - and were then 
significantly exceeded as land invasions continued. ‘Beneficiary selection’ no longer 
focused particularly on skilled, well-resourced entrepreneurial farmers, but responded to 
local circumstance, sometimes involving political pressure to offer poorer people land as 
well as the manouevering of elite interests (UNDP, 2002; PLRC, 2003; Sachikonye, 
2003; Masiiwa, 2004; Marongwe, 2003, Marongwe 2009).  
 
The result has been a tense to-and-fro between the technocrats who have tried to 
reassert their authority and the politicians, who have continued to use the offer of new 
land as a form of patronage (Fontein, 2005). Thus technical definitions of viability – in 
terms of farm size, land use and business plans – rubbed up against political expediency 
and processes of local political accommodation. Thus, in any area today, some so-called 
A1 farms are larger than some A2 farms, with significant numbers of both A1 and A2 
farms being smaller than what was deemed the ‘viable’ economic size for that particular 
natural region, as more people were squeezed in. In many places, disputes and 
uncertainties persist about the status of new settlements, with some areas still being 
‘informal’, having been settled spontaneously during the invasion period with a wide 
variety of settlement and land use patterns. And alongside this variety of smallholdings, 
very large farms do still persist, sometimes held by former owners and sometimes 
having been taken over by a politically well-connected ‘new’ farmer.  
 
Fast-track land reform has resulted in extreme diversity, certainly at a national level, but 
also within districts and provinces, and even on single former farms (Chaumba et al, 
2003b; Moyo, 2005; Scoones, 2008). The debate about ‘viability’ in Zimbabwe today 
therefore is particularly complex and much more contested than elsewhere in the region. 
At the level of formal policy there remains a distinction between a household food 
security oriented objective (for A1) and a business-oriented, commercial objective (for 
A2), reflecting a mix of livelihood and welfarist perspectives and neo-classical and new 
institutional economics perspectives respectively. Dualism remains a strong feature of 
official thinking about the agrarian economy, but the variations within and across these 
models is such that neat distinctions do not mean much in practice. As people establish 
themselves on the new farms a large range of trajectories are evident – and with this 
multiple versions of viability. Different people, with different assets, different connections 
and different ambitions are able to do very different things with the land. What happens 
on new land gained under the Fast-Track Programme is highly dependent on wider 
livelihood portfolios of individuals and households, as well as social, economic and 
political connections. Constructions of viability therefore vary significantly within the new 
resettlements, and may not tally with those in the minds of the technocrats and planners. 
Zimbabwean experience thus suggests that a fundamental rethink of definitions and 
framings of success and viability is required in land redistribution settings. 
 
Namibia 
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Namibia is somewhat different from South Africa and Zimbabwe, in that white settlers 
took possession of land that was mostly semi-arid in nature and suitable for livestock 
production rather than cropping. As a result it was relatively sparsely populated. People 
living in more densely settled areas with higher rainfall and thus suitable for cropping, 
found in the north of the country, were generally not dispossessed. White farmers 
established a commercial farming sector based largely on extensive livestock ranching, 
with farm size averaging between 5000 and 6000 hectares. Land redistribution is 
focused on these large ranches (Werner and Kruger 2007: 6).  
 
Before independence in 1990, SWAPO thinking on land reform ‘was essentially 
pragmatic’ and its approach was modeled in part on the approach being followed by 
Zimbabwe in the 1980s, in relation to both methods of land acquisition and resettlement 
models (ibid: 6). In SWAPO’s view farms in the semi-arid south of the country needed to 
be kept ‘viable and efficient’ (ibid: 6). After independence, according to Tapscott (1995: 
165), the most vocal claims for land redistribution came from wealthier black farmers 
wanting to increase their access to land. A national conference on land reform in 1991 
tried to find a balance between concerns for addressing colonial dispossession, equity 
and efficiency. It resolved to base decisions on the redistribution of freehold land on 
‘scientific data’ on issues such as the extent of under-utilized land, multiple ownership of 
farms, and ‘viable farm sizes’ (Werner and Kruger 2007: 9).  
 
A land redistribution policy framework was adopted in which government purchases 
large scale commercial farms on from willing sellers, sub-divides the farms and allocates 
the new units to small-scale farmers. The objectives are to redress past imbalances, 
provide opportunities for food self-sufficiency, create employment in full-time farming, 
‘bring smallholder farmers into the mainstream of the Namibian economy by producing 
for the market’, alleviate population pressure in communal areas, and allow those 
displaced by the war of liberation to re-integrate into society. Previously disadvantaged 
Namibians are specified as the targeted beneficiaries (RoN 2001: 3).  
 
The main resettlement model that has been pursued is the Farm Unit Resettlement 
Scheme (FURS), in which individual beneficiaries owning not more than 150 large stock 
units are allocated a ‘small’ farm (notionally at least 1500 ha in extent in the north, and 
3000 ha in the south)19 and enter into a long term lease agreement with government 
(Werner and Kruger 2007: 13). A small number of group schemes for unemployed farm 
workers and very poor people have also been implemented, mainly adjacent to 
communal areas in the north where cropping is feasible. In addition to resettlement, an 
Affirmative Action Loan Scheme (AALS) provides subsidies for purchase of commercial 
farms by black Namibians, with the objective of encouraging large herd owners from 
communal areas to ‘become fully-fledged commercial farmers’ (ibid: 14). By 2005 a total 
of 625 farms had been acquired through AALS, compared to 163 under FURS, or almost 
four times as many. Around 85 percent of freehold land remained in the ownership of 
whites (ibid: 17).  
 
Although policy documents have occasionally voiced concerns that land reform was not 
doing enough to address poverty, government planning targets continue to be low. For 
example, only 36 families per annum were to be resettled under FURS between 2001 
                                            
19
 In practice, average resettlement farm sizes have been smaller than these targets:1200 ha in 
the north and 2138 ha in the south (Werner and Kruger 2007: 13).. 
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and 2006, compared to official estimates that 243 000 people were ‘unemployed, 
homeless and landless’ and eligible for resettlement (ibid: 20).  
 
The majority of FURS beneficiaries earn most of their income off-farm from jobs or 
businesses, many are employed in low-level clerical jobs in government, and less than a 
third regard farming as their main occupation. One study concluded that they are can be 
classified as ‘lower-middle income households’ (ibid: 21). Some studies suggest that the 
major farming problems facing beneficiaries have been inadequate capital to build 
livestock herd size to the point where the grazing resources of the farm are fully utilized, 
and lack of sufficient water points (Schuh et al 2006, cited in Werner and Kruger 2007: 
23). Another study found that gross margins per annum from livestock sales in 2003 
were around N$ 6 799, compared to a ‘decent living income’ for Namibia estimated by 
the National Planning Commission at N$ 15 000 per annum for a household of five (PTT 
2005: 50, cited in Werner and Kruger 2007: 24). Lack of post-settlement technical 
support, especially in relation to management skills, has been commonly identified as a 
major problem. 
 
Few data on AALS beneficiaries are available, but Sherbourne (2004: 16) suggests that 
the evidence on hand suggests that most are part-time rather than full-time farmers. 
Many appear to be finding it difficult to repay their loans, in part due to the fact that land 
prices are much higher than the productive value of the land, and many have had to sell 
livestock to service loans at the expense of building up herd size (Werner and Kruger 
2007: 25). 
 
A notion of ‘economically viable farm size’ has been central to debates about land 
redistribution in Namibia, the key reference point being the profitability of commercial 
livestock ranching. The National Land Policy states that subdivision of large farms 
should be conditional on the ‘maintenance of farming units of an economically viable 
size’ (RoN 1998: 16, cited in Werner and Kruger 2007: 22). Government’s Permanent 
Technical Team on Land Reform has suggested that ‘there is a cut-off point below which 
a piece of land cannot be farmed on economically viable basis’, but ‘any size above this 
absolute minimum depends on the income expectations people have’ (PTT 2005: 22, 
cited in Werner and Kruger 2007: 22). The Ministry of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation has accepted a target income of N$15 000 per annum for a household of 
five. 
 
Other studies suggest that small-scale cattle farmers on 1 000 ha could earn gross 
margins of around N$ 27 000 per annum, and sheep farmers on 3 000 ha in the arid 
southern regions could generate a gross margin of N$ 99 000 per annum. However, 
these potential incomes assumed that beneficiaries owned sufficient livestock, or had 
access to sufficient off-farm income to finance herd build-up, and had experience of 
managing medium-scale farming enterprises (GFA 2003: 14, cited in Werner and Kruger 
2007: 23), and it appears that few, if any, beneficiaries, meet these criteria . In contrast, 
the Namibia Agriculture Union argues that farming is a business and that the yardstick 
for viability should be ‘medium enterprises’ with a turnover of N$ 1 million per annum, no 
more than ten employees and no less than 500 large stock units. This would require 
farm sizes ranging from 5 000 to 8 000 ha (NAU 2005: 54, cited in Werner and Kruger 
2007: 22). 
 
Werner argues that current models of resettlement do not accommodate the poor, and 
that alternative modes of land utilization need to be developed, such as range 
 26 
management areas used by groups organized into grazing associations, or even the 
expansion of communal areas (Werner and Kruger 2007: 31).  This implies rather 
different interpretations of viability than those that currently dominate policy thinking, 
which are all based on scaled-down versions of commercial ranching. 
 
Rethinking viability in Southern African land reform 
 
As previous sections have shown, debates about viability and land reform in South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia involve contested, overlapping and sometimes 
contradictory framings of viability. The result is often extreme policy incoherence and 
tension, even within political formations which are committed to particular visions of land 
reform. To move the debate forward, a substantial and informed deliberation on 
alternative framings – and their conceptual underpinnings - is urgently needed. How to 
go about this? What are the questions that must be asked? This is inevitably an 
intensely political process: different framings are pushed by different interest groups with 
different interests. Consensus on an ideal will always be elusive. But analysis and 
deliberation remains important, for without this dominant framings always have their 
way.  
This final section therefore explores how the different frameworks introduced earlier 
define the ‘success’ of redistributive land reforms. Key elements are summarized in 
Table 1.  The key questions posed at the bottom of the table are all important and 
complementary, and, in our view, need to be asked together to help define an effective, 
progressive and holistic approach to land reform.  
 
For example, from the neo-classical economics perspective, the key question is: how 
efficient is production on redistributed land? A concern with productive efficiency cannot 
be dismissed; policies that promote the optimal use of scarce land, labour and capital 
are important, while not accepting a simplistic emphasis on ‘market forces’ as the driver 
of wealth creation. From the new institutional economics perspective, the key question 
is: what factors and conditions influence the efficiency of different scales of production? 
Questions of scale of production are highly relevant in the southern African context, and 
so a focus on factors (including institutions and policies) that influence the efficiency of a 
variety of forms and scales of production is important, while not accepting the neo-
institutionalist premise of a pervasive inverse relationship between scale and efficiency. 
From a livelihoods perspective, the key question is: what are the multiple sources of 
livelihood for land reform beneficiaries? In southern Africa, a focus on the multiple 
livelihood sources of poor people would help avoid an overly-narrow focus on farming 
alone, while not being blind to the structural roots of poverty. From a welfarist 
perspective, the key question is: what difference does food production make to 
household welfare of land reform beneficiaries? The potential impacts of land 
redistribution on household food security and vulnerability are unquestionably significant 
in southern Africa, while this does not mean accepting the view that this should be the 
main purpose of land reform. From contemporary radical populist perspectives, the key 
question is: does land reform transform exploitative agrarian structures and food 
regimes? In the southern African setting, one might therefore take on board a central 
concern with the need to reconfigure food production regimes and associated agrarian 
structures (at both the national and international scale), including the distribution of 
productive enterprises and associated property rights, and their performance in terms of 
output and net income, while not accepting an over-emphasis on the common interests 
of ‘peasants’ or ‘the rural poor’. Finally, from the Marxist tradition the key question is: 
what dynamics of class differentiation and accumulation occur within land reform? A 
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central concern with evaluating the economics of land reform in terms of a wider concept 
of social efficiency and the contribution of agriculture to the growth of society’s 
productive capacities would be an important contribution in the southern African context. 
This would combine with a focus on the class and gender relations that underpin the 
organization of production and of agrarian structure, while not accepting the idealization 
of large-scale farming in some strands of the tradition, or an overly-narrow focus on 
class dynamics to the exclusion of other relevant factors. 
 
Derived from our earlier analysis of experiences from southern Africa – but also a 
reflection on underlying analytical paradigms – we suggest that each of the above 
questions must be posed in tandem in any assessment of the viability – or success – of 
land redistribution or agrarian reform. A debate about alternative framings and their 
implications for policy could then unfold in a way that would help shift the debate about 
viability away from the narrow, technocratic economism which has dominated the way 
such issues have been viewed in southern Africa and beyond to date. Too often this 
dominant framing has been allied to strong normative assumptions and well-articulated 
political and commercial interests, hooked into a long history of the assumed benefits of 
a dualistic agrarian system where modern, large-scale agriculture is seen as the ideal.  
 
We suggest that a more textured and variegated approach to assessing viability, rooted 
in diverse conceptual frameworks, can provide a more effective – and ultimately more 
rigorous – approach to the assessment of redistributive land reform. Using the key 
questions highlighted in Table 1 and discussed above, Table 2 offers a set of 
assessment approaches that, in combination, could be used to explore these themes, 
redefining viability – and associated measures of success – in new ways. Each offers a 
different lens on the questions surrounding ‘viability’, drawing on different conceptual 
frameworks, with different foci and scales. Taken together, we argue, these provide a 
more comprehensive approach to assessing land and agrarian reform. 
 
Eclecticism has its limits, however, and the different ‘lenses’ in Table 2 have to be 
integrated into a more coherent and robust alternative model that shows how they link 
to each other in practice, which will involve trade-offs and prioritization rather than 
simple ‘combination’. As discussed, this must inevitably be a political process, 
informed by deliberation about alternative framings, as each analytical framing of 
viability is necessarily co-constructed with a different politics of land and agrarian 
reform. In tandem with analyses of empirical data on the livelihoods impacts of land 
redistribution in southern Africa, the elaboration of such an alternative model is in 
progress20. This prioritizes assessing the material conditions of possibility of 
productive farming on redistributed land, in combination with other forms of income 
and means of securing a livelihood. It involves the evaluation of a number of critical 
factors: agro-ecological realities such as soil and climate, the availability of productive 
technologies appropriate to these realities, the availability of capital for investment in 
productive enterprises, and the structure and dynamics of agro-food markets and 
value chains. Our approach also stresses the need to factor in the social organization 
of agricultural production and incipient processes of socio-economic (i.e. class) 
differentiation in (often complex) articulations with other social identities such as 
gender and age, with assessments  foregrounding the socially and politically 
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 Under the auspices of the ‘livelihoods after land reform in southern Africa’ programme, 
www.lalr.org.za 
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embedded nature of property rights, production systems and power relations in land 
redistribution programmes and contexts.  
 
In sum, we argue that assessments of viability must embrace heterogeneity, 
complexity and competition in relation to multiple objectives (what different people 
want), multiple livelihoods (what different people do), multiple scales (including 
linkages between local, national, regional and global economies) and multiple 
contexts (including the structural dimensions of political economy, as well as local 
project/scheme settings). In this approach, the politics of land is at the very centre of 
assessments of viability, and arises from the changing significance of land and 
farming for different categories of people in rural Southern Africa. Thus land reform in 
whose interest remains the core question that viability debates must seek to clarify. 
 
 
Table 2: Assessing land reform and framing viability: six key questions 
 
Conceptual framework and key question Approaches to assessing land reform –and 
framing viability 
 
Neo-classical economics: How efficient is 
production on redistributed land? 
 
 
Returns to land, labour and capital across 
different farm sizes. Focus on production 
efficiency – and farm scale.  
New institutional economics: What factors and 
conditions influence the efficiency of different 
scales of production? 
 
 
Transaction costs (e.g. labour supervision) and 
institutional factors (e.g. market functioning) 
affecting production in land reform areas. Non-
market interventions to improve efficiency 
through coordination. Focus on institutional 
conditions – and programme-level scales. 
 
Livelihoods perspectives: What are the multiple 
sources of livelihood for land reform 
beneficiaries? 
Multiple livelihood portfolios, with land access 
contributing to overall sustainability of diverse 
and differentiated livelihoods.  Focus on 
livelihoods and local economic linkages – and 
household, community and regional economic 
scales. 
 
Welfarist approaches: What difference does 
food production make to household welfare of 
land reform beneficiaries? 
 
Role of land – and agricultural production 
derived from it - as a source of social 
protection, and a buffer against shocks and 
stresses. Focus on vulnerability – and 
individual and household scale.   
 
Radical political economy: Does land reform 
transform exploitative agrarian structures and 
food regimes? 
Changes in agrarian structure, and the position 
of and relationships between peasants, 
workers and large-scale farmers – and the 
wider agrarian economy. Focus on political 
economy and (food) sovereignty – and regional 
scales. 
 
Marxism: What dynamics of class 
differentiation and accumulation occur within 
land reform? 
Patterns of accumulation (and decline, 
dispossession) across different classes – and 
genders - in land reform settings – and the 
impacts on wider economic growth and class 
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strucure. Focus on class – and broader scales. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A central challenge – certainly for southern Africa, but also beyond - lies in embracing a 
new approach to assessing land reform, and thus to understanding viability and success. 
This must go beyond the narrow technical view that currently holds much debate on land 
reform in southern Africa in its iron grip. As we have seen, the dominant approach is 
strongly influenced by project appraisal and farm management techniques developed for 
the large-scale commercial farming sector, is powerfully informed by ideas about 
efficiency derived from neo-classical economics, and is rooted in the dominance of a 
particular type of commercial farming within a highly dualistic agrarian structure. This 
approach is ideological, rather than technical and ‘neutral’. This paper argues that 
alternative framings, from diverse theoretical and political traditions, help to expand and 
enrich the debate, and to clarify a central question: whose interests does reform serve? 
 
The implications are several. One is that an expanded and more diverse set of 
measures of viability than those used in the past is required, which in turn requires new 
methodologies for the collection and analysis of data. A more plural, holistic and 
integrated set of methods will acknowledge the tensions and trade-offs between different 
pathways of agrarian change – and so also of different framings of viability and success. 
A second implication is that analysts and policy makers should be encouraged to make 
explicit their framing assumptions, underlying values and larger policy goals when 
assessing or advocating alternative policy options for redistributive land reform. This will 
help to locate their assessments and choices within the framework of competing 
paradigms and approaches, and facilitate consideration of coherence and consistency. It 
will also make deliberation about alternative policy directs more informed, and the trade-
offs – technical, economic and political – more explicit. Finally, bringing a wider array of 
perspectives into the picture, and making clear the different assumptions, political 
commitments and methodologies for assessment implied by each, could contribute to a 
more effective and coherent public debate about land reform policies. In southern Africa, 
in particular, this is urgently needed. 
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 Neo-classical 
economics 
New institutional 
economics 
Livelihoods – a 
developmentist 
version 
Livelihoods - a 
welfarist version 
Radical political 
economy 
Marxism 
Central 
focus 
Well-functioning 
markets vs market 
distortions and 
‘imperfections’ 
Linking equity and 
productivity 
Development as 
livelihood 
improvement and 
poverty reduction 
Poverty alleviation, 
social protection 
Development as 
agrarian 
transformation 
The Agrarian 
Question,  
focusing on the 
transition to 
capitalism in 
agriculture 
Key 
concepts 
Efficiency in factor 
productivity (land, 
labour, capital) 
Transaction costs, 
institutions, the 
inverse relationship 
Multiple and 
diverse 
livelihoods; ‘de-
agrarianization’ 
Household food 
security; 
vulnerability; social 
protection 
Peasants are a 
social class 
exploited by a 
global corporate 
food regime 
 
Food sovereignty 
Social relations of 
production, 
property and 
power (class); 
dynamics of 
accumulation in 
agriculture;  
Land and 
agric in 
wider 
context  
Declining role of 
agric in economy; 
globalization of 
agro-food markets 
is positive in 
lowering food costs 
Unequal land 
distribution can 
constrain economic 
growth 
Key role of 
agriculture in kick-
starting growth; 
globalization 
offers 
opportunities but 
often negative for 
the poor 
Small-scale 
agriculture as 
residual, as safety 
net 
A global corporate 
global food regime 
dispossesses 
peasants via 
market discipline & 
renders them 
‘redundant’ 
 
Links between 
agricultural 
development & 
industrialization 
are a key issue 
 
Globalization is a 
key feature of 
contemporary 
capitalism 
 
 38 
 
 Neo-classical 
economics 
New institutional 
economics 
Livelihoods Welfarism Radical political 
economy 
Marxism 
Policies 
advocated 
Market-led land 
reform: reduce 
market 
imperfections; 
register private 
property rights; 
provide credit to 
promote investment 
Market-assisted 
land reform: reduce 
policy biases 
favouring large 
farms or urban 
consumers; 
promote efficient 
markets; secure 
property rights; 
credit; land taxes 
State action to 
support 
smallholder 
production eg land 
reform, targeted 
subsidies, co-
ordination of 
marketing; 
. 
Enhanced and 
secure access to 
land for small-scale 
food production as a 
safety net 
Radical agrarian 
reform that 
secures rights to 
land and 
resources by 
peasant farmers 
 
Food sovereignty  
 
(a) Retain efficient 
large capitalist 
farms & improve 
conditions of 
labour), or (b) 
reforms that 
promote 
accumulation from 
below, or (c) support 
struggles for land by 
exploited classes 
Beneficiaries Efficient farmers at 
any scale; (often 
economies of scale 
apply and larger 
farms seen as 
socially efficient) 
Efficient small 
farmers who 
maximize returns to 
land 
The rural poor 
with multiple 
livelihoods; small 
farmers 
The rural poor and 
unemployed with 
limited access to  
jobs or alternative 
incomes 
Peasants (small 
family farmers); 
landless farm 
workers; the rural 
poor 
Landless workers, 
semi-proletarians, 
petty commodity 
producers, 
emerging capitalist 
farmers  
Measures of 
‘viability’ 
Farm efficiency; 
rates of return on 
investment; 
minimum viable 
farm size 
Farm efficiency; 
distribution of 
income; poverty 
impacts; growth 
multipliers 
Livelihood 
impacts; poverty 
measures 
Levels of household 
food production that 
make efficient use of 
household resources 
Rurality, 
agriculture & food 
are central to 
social and 
ecological 
sustainability 
 
A function of class 
relations and 
dynamics 
 
Agriculture’s 
contribution to 
national economic 
growth 
Key 
questions 
How efficient is 
production on 
redistributed land? 
Returns to land, 
labour, capital? 
What factors & 
conditions influence 
the efficiency of 
different scales of 
production? 
What are the 
multiple sources 
of livelihood for 
land reform 
beneficiaries? 
What difference 
does food production 
make to household 
welfare of land 
reform beneficiaries? 
Does land reform 
transform 
exploitative 
agrarian 
structures and 
food regimes? 
What dynamics of 
class differentiation 
and accumulation 
occur within LR? 
 
